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A logic, PrDL, is presented, which enables formal reasoning about probabilistic programs 
or, alternatively, reasoning probabilistically about conventional programs. The syntax of 
PrDL derives from Pratt’s first-order dynamic logic and the semantics extends Kozen’s 
semantics of probabilistic programs. An axiom system for PrDL is presented and shown to be 
complete relative to an extension of first-order analysis. For discrete probabilities it is shown 
that first-order analysis actually suffkes. Examples are presented, both of the expressive 
power of PrDL, and of a proof in the axiom system. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Probabilistic algorithms are receiving increasing attention lately, as efficient 
probabilistic solutions are found for problems which seem otherwise to be hard or 
even unsolvable [ 16, 17, 111. Most of the effort has been directed at constructing 
particular algorithms and analyzing the mathematical principles underlying each of 
them, and in some cases informal justification for the correct behavior of such 
algorithms has been given. However, very little has been done towards providing 
formal tools, such as programming logics and axiom systems, for reasoning about 
probabilistic programs. 
The importance of such tools lies in their potential for aiding both in the conven- 
tional analysis of probabilistic programs and in the probabilistic analysis of 
sequential programs; an example of the latter is the analysis of average case 
behaviour. (See, e.g., [25].) 
An essential prerequisite for constructing a logic for reasoning about any class of 
programs is the availability of an appropriate formal semantics for the programs 
themselves. In the realms of sequential, nondeterministic, and, to an extent, 
concurrent programs, a variety of possible semantics exists. Thus, for example, 
dynamic logic [ 151 is constructed around the relational semantics of nondeterministic 
programs, and temporal logic [ 141 is built upon path semantics for concurrent 
programs. 
This prerequisite, when considered for probabilistic programs, has been satisfied in 
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a convincing manner by Kozen’s recent paper [9]. In [9], two equivalent semantics 
are defined for probabilistic while programs (which allow a random choice 
assignment). The first interprets a program. as a partial measurable function on a 
certain measurable space, and the second (which is the one preferred by Kozen and 
which is adopted in this paper) as a linear operator on a certain Banach space of 
measures. 
The problem considered in this paper is actually stated by Kozen [9, p. 1131 to be 
“probably the most beneficial” direction for future work. Kozen suggests studying 
assertion languages for probabilistic programs and constructing “systems of axioms 
and proof rules which might then be shown sound and complete relative to analysis.” 
One attempt at responding to this challenge is Reif s PROB-DL [ 191. This is a 
propositional logic based, in form, on Fischer and Ladner’s PDL [3]. However, the 
programming language treated in [ 191 is unlike Kozen’s, and, in particular, contains 
no deterministic branching construct. Also, probabilities in [19] are restricted to 
rational constants. The fact that probabilities cannot be accessed via variables 
prevents the possibility of expressing many properties of interest, such as those 
relating the probabilities of two different events. 
Another attempt is Ramshaw’s Frequency System [ 181. This is a semi-formal 
system based on the Floyd-Hoare inductive assertion method. In the Frequency 
System, each assertion represents all activity through a given point in the program, 
summed over the entire program execution. However, the formalism in [ 181, in 
particular, the restriction to “vanilla assertions,” does not provide closure of the class 
of assertions under negation. Obtaining a completeness result is left in [ 181 too as a 
major direction for future work. 
The purpose of the present work is to define a formal logic, PrDL, with syntax 
deriving from Pratt’s first-order dynamic logic [ 151, and semantics extending Kozen’s 
semantics to formulas involving probabilistic programs. We give axioms and proof 
rules for this system, and show soundness and completeness relative to the underlying 
program free language, which is a certain extension of first-order analysis. 
As in relative and arithmetical completeness theorems for conventional programs, 
the completeness result provides a structured method for translating assertions about 
probabilistic programs (and also probabilistic assertions about conventional 
programs) into equivalent statements in an appropriate program-free logic, within 
which their correctness can be checked directly (though, of course, in general, not 
effectively). 
Section 2 of this paper defines the syntax of the language, Section 3 defines the 
semantics, and Section 4 contains some examples and a discussion. Section 5 presents 
the axioms and proof rules and shows soundness and completeness, and Section 6 
contains a detailed proof of one of the examples. In Section 7 we show that for 
discrete probabilities tirst-order analysis actually sufftces for completeness. In 
Section 8 we conclude and discuss possible future work. 
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2. THE SYNTAX OF PrDL 
The language of PrDL allows probabilistic assertions about events in the domain 
of computation and the effects that programs have on them. We are also interested in 
subprobability measures, in order to express loss of probabilistic mass due to nonter- 
minating computations. Hence the language is defined in terms of general finite 
(positive) measures, and instead of probability our basic concept is frequency 
(cf. [ 181). The flavour of the language is illustrated by the following formula, which 
expresses the fact that with probability 1 a sequence of coin tosses will eventually 
include a head. In programming terminology, a program which makes repeated 
random draws (with 0 and 1 each appearing with probability $) until the first 1 is 
drawn will terminate with probability 1. 
Fr(true) = 1 2 {x c ?; while x = 0 do x e ?} Fr(true) = 1. 
The language is divided into two levels. The first is essentially a first-order 
language describing events in the domain of computation, and the programs execute 
in this domain. The second level is the language of first-order analysis with certain 
extensions needed for describing probabilities of those events and for incorporating 
the programs. The variables of this second level (called global variables) can be used 
as constants in the first level. 
The variables over the domain of computation are the program variables, denoted 
by x, , x2 ,.... These are the variables used by programs, and can be assigned values by 
them. In the structure of analysis (i.e., on the second level), however, these variables 
do not have values, only distributions. The global variables of the structure of 
analysis range over the reals and are v, , v2 ,.... We require the language of analysis to 
contain (besides its standard function and predicate symbols +, <, etc.) a special 
unary predicate symbol nat, with nat(v) true whenever v is a nonnegative integer. 
In addition, we need a means of referring to the distribution of the random number 
generator used in programs. This is given by the independent, identically distributed 
variables random,(t), for a fixed natural number i > 0 and program term t. These will 
be used to simulate repeated random assignments by using 
y c y + 1; x c random,(y) 
instead of the random assignment x t ?. The subscript i is a syntactic device used to 
force certain distinct occurrences of random to refer to distinct random variables. 
Terms in the domain of computation are called program terms, and include 
constants, program variables, global variables, function applications F(t, ,..., tk) for 
program terms t, ,..., t,, and random,(t) variables. 
EXAMPLES. x,, (x2 + x3) . v, , random&x,). 
Events are first-order combinations of atomic predicates of the form P(tl ,..., t,J for 
program terms t, ,..., k, t where quantification is allowed only over program variables. 
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EXAMPLES. vx, (Xl = 1 v v, . x, 2 O), 3x, (random,(x,) = 0). 
Terms of the structure of analysis are real-valued combinations of constants, global 
variables, or frequency terms Fr(P) for an event P. 
EXAMPLES. u1 + v2, Fr(x, = 1) - vj, Fr(x, = 0) + Fr(x, = l), Fr(true). 
We shall use Pr(P) as an abbreviation for 
if Fr(true) # 0 then Fr(P) else 0 
I Fr(true) ’ 
which in essence normalizes the measure Fr(P) to a probability measure. More 
formally, we write Pr(P) = v instead of 
(Fr(true) # 0 1 v . Fr(true) = Fr(P)) A (Fr(true) = 0 3 v = 0). 
Programs are deterministic while programs over simple assignments xi * t for a 
program term t and random assignments xi t ?, using if = then = else and while = do. 
The tests are simply events. 
EXAMPLE. while x, # x2 do (if x1 > x2 then x1 t x, - x2 else x2 + x2 - x,). 
Finally, the formulas of PrDL are obtained from atomic formulas by first-order 
combinations and the construct {a} P, for a program a and formula P. This latter 
construct, similar to (CI) of dynamic logic, means “after execution of a, P will be 
true.” Here quantification is over global variables only; program variables are 
confined to programs and events. Examples are presented in Section 4. 
Both in formulas and in events we shall use A, --, 3, V, true and false as 
abbreviations in the usual way. 
As in the first-order predicate calculus, we have to define free occurrences of a 
global variable u in a formula P. An occurrence is free if it is so by the usual 
definition, and in addition, u occurs free in {a}Q if u E a (i.e., u appears in a 
program term appearing in the program a) or if u occurs free in Q. Also, the usual 
definition of substitutability is augmented by the clause stating that a term T is 
substitutable for v in {a}Q if T has no Fr subterm and T is substitutable for v in Q. 
As a consequence of these definitions we allow consistent renaming by alphabetic 
variants whenever necessary. The restriction that T cannot refer to frequencies can be 
overcome by using 
Vu@ = TX P[v/u]) 
for a new variable U, instead of P[v/T]. 
Due to the presence of nat, the program-free sublanguage of PrDL, which we 
denote by PrL, is essentially the language of first-order analysis, with the additional 
features Fr and random. However, since first-order analysis is equivalent to second- 
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order arithmetic [20, Section 16.21, we can in fact assume that we have integer 
function and predicate symbols. Moreover, standard techniques can be employed to 
encode a real-valued functionf(n) of integers (or equivalently, a sequence of reals) as 
an integer function g(n, m) of two integer variables. Henceforth we shall freely use 
and quantify over such real-valued functions. 
3. THE SEMANTICS OF PrDL 
A model for PrDL is a structure 
where: 
D is taken to be the domain of real numbers. 
Z is an interpretation for all the constants, function symbols, and predicate 
symbols of the language. An interpretation for a constant is an element of D. 
An interpretation for a function or predicate symbol is a function or predicate 
of the appropriate arity, over D. 
V is an assignment of values in D to the global variables, similar to 1. 
s3f is a a-algebra of subsets of D such that the infinite product o-algebra 
d(W) x &‘(“‘) contains all meanings of events, to be given below. 
P is a probability measure on (D, d). (p(D) = 1.) 
We now extend the meaning provided by Z and V for constants and variables to the 
other objects of the language: 
The meaning of a program term t is a function t”: D” x D” -+ D, where the first 
w arguments correspond to the element variables and the last to the random,(t) 
variables: 
. The meaning of a constant c is the constant function with value Z(c). 
. The meaning of a program variable xi is the projection function xi, given by 
xi(a * 9 u2 v-*9 b,) b,,...) = a,. 
. The meaning of a global variable ui is the constant function with value V(Vi). 
. (F(t, ,..., t,)r’= Z(F) 0 (f,..., ff). 
. (random,@))“= n[w+r(i, 143 
where ~,+~(a~, a2,..., b,, b2,...) = bi, and r is a standard pairing function which 
is used simply to avoid having to specify w* copies of D. If t” is not 
integer, r produces 1. The idea is simply to ensure that different i’s and f’s 
represent different random variables. 
The meaning of an event P is a subset p of D” X D” containing those values of 
the variables for which it is true: 
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. (Ip)A=~=D”xD”-P,f 
. (3x,P)&= { (2, y))I 3d E D : @[x,/d], y) E p}, 
where $xJd] is the vector obtained by replacing the ith coordinate of ff with 
d. 
At this point each event has been assigned a subset of D” x D”. By the restriction 
on the model, the infinite product a-algebra J&‘) x J@‘) contains all these sets. 
Note that this now implies that the meanings of program terms and events are 
measurable functions on and subsets of the product measure space (D” X D”, 
JP”) x &““‘), respectively. Now, we let M be the set of all finite positive measures 
on the space (D”, ~4’“‘). Elements of M are called states. 
In the case of the real numbers it is not at all clear that the simplest continuous 
distributions even exist in our u-algebra d. The reason is rooted in our formal need 
to include many sets in -c9, thus limiting the possible measures for them. In 
particular, the assumption that a uniform distribution over [0, l] exists violates the 
Axiom of Constructibility [ 13, 12, 211. This problem can be solved by restricting 
legal events to be first-order combinations of atomic predicates in which reals are 
quantified over only existentially. This has the effect of making events denote analytic 
sets, and does not affect any of our proofs and results below. In this way, if atomic 
predicates and functions have Lebesgue-measurable meanings, so do events in 
general, and the o-algebra & can be taken to be simply the u-algebra of Lebesgue- 
measurable sets. Of course, if measures are discrete there is no problem to begin with. 
The meaning of a term T is a function T’: M-P .%‘, from states to the reals: 
. The meaning of a constant c is the constant function with value Z(c). 
. The meaning of a global variable ui is a constant function with value V(u,). 
. (Fr(P)“‘)@) = (u x @“)(p”>. (I.e., th e meaning of Fr(P) in a state ,U is the 
frequency of the event P, given the measure p for the program variables and 
independent distributions p for each of the random variables. The meaning of 
Pr(P) will then be the probability of the event P in the appropriately 
normalized probability measure.) 
. NT, ,..., T,)r = Z(F) 0 (Tf,..., T;“>. 
The semantics of while-programs in Kozen’s second semantics [9, pp. 106-1071. 
We present it here briefly: 
The meaning of a program a is a transformation aA on the set of states h4. 
. (X,Cty(u)=p~o-’ 
where t^: D” + D” is defined by 
fh, a2 ,..., a,,...) = (a,, a2 ,..., fx(a, ,...) ,... ). 
A PROBABILISTIC DYNAMIC LOGIC 199 
. (Xie?)qp)=V 
where v, on a measurable cylinder, is given by 
v(B, x B, x . ..xB.xDxDX...) 
=p(B, x . ..x f x . ..x B, x D x D x ..a )p(B,). 
. (a; py = p” 0 a-5 
. (if P then a else /3r = c? 0 epA + PM 0 epx 
where eB is the map taking ,U to ,u~ such that &(A) =,u(A n B), i.e., pu, is 0 
outside of B. 
. (while P do CZ)~= CEO epT 0 (a”‘~ epd)k. 
The meaning of a formula P is a subset P” of M containing those states in which it 
is true. Alternatively, we say that a state ,u satisJies a formula P and write &, lu b P 
whenever ,U E P M Where there is no confusion we will omit the A, and write ,u + P: . 
. P i= P(T, ,..., Tk) ifl (T;‘cU),..., F@>> E I(P). 
. ~t=PVQiff~~Por~+Q. 
. p b ,P iff p # P (i.e., ~1 @G P”). 
. ,U != 3v,P iff there is r E SP such that J[uJr], ,u + P (i.e., ,U E PA”@‘). 
. ,U b {a} P iff cr”@) + P (i.e., P is to be evaluated in the state obtained by 
transforming the current state p according to the program a). 
(Note: Our {a} operator corresponds to the (a) and [a] operators of DL. In DL, 
with deterministic programs such as the ones here, the difference between the two is 
solely in the nonterminating computations. However, in our probabilistic models 
programs always “terminate” in states. The fact that conventional computations do 
not terminate is captured by reduced mass in such final states. Hence, in fact, {a} is 
its own dual; i.e., 7{a} ,P E {a} P.) 
DEFINITION. A formula P is said to be A-valid, written J l== P, if JR; ,u b P 
holds for every p in k, it is valid if it is J-valid in every model k, it is satisfiable 
if its negation is not valid. 
4. EXAMPLES AND DISCUSSION 
First we present a few examples of the expressiveness of the language: 
(1) The fact that a program a ends with certainty is expressed by the PrDL, 
formula 
Fr(true) = 1 2 {a} Fr(true) = 1. 
200 FELDMAN AND HAREL 
(2) Partial correctness of a relative to P and Q is given by 
Pr(P) = 1 I {cx}(Pr(Q) = 1 V Fr(true) = 0). 
(3) Total correctness is a combination of the previous two formulas: 
(Fr(true) = 1 A Pr(P) = 1) 2 (a} Fr(Q) = 1. 
(4) Kozen’s example “this program halts with probability at least Y” is 
Fr(true) = 1 IJ {a} Fr(true) > U. 
(5) Kozen’s second example “this program takes at most nk steps with probability 
2-k,, is 
Fr(true) = 1 ZI Vk{a) Fr(m Q n”) = 2-k, 
where m is a program variable counting the number of steps the program takes. 
(6) The following formula expresses the fact that the first head will occur at the 
IZ th toss with probability 2-“: 
Fr(true) = 1 3 {i +-l;x+-?;whilex<~do(x+-?;ici+ l)} 
Fr(true) = 1 A Vn(nat(n) A 12 > 1 3 Fr(i = n) = 2-“). 
(Here i and x are program variables, n is global). 
This formula is valid, for example, in all models where p is a uniform distribution 
over the unit interval [0, 11, or where 0 and 1 each appear with probability {. (Cf. 
[ 18, pp. 75-791). 
(7) The program in the following formula accumulates the results of Lx] random 
draws. (Here [xJ is the “floor” of x; i.e., the greatest integer less than or equal to x.) 
The formula itself is valid. 
Pr(/xj = k) = 1 A k > 1 
~{y+O;z+l;whilez<xdo(w+?;y+y+w;z+z+ 1)} 
Vv Pr(y & v) = Pr $J random,(i) < v . 
i=l 
It might seem advantageous to consider the nondeterministic program constructs 
U and * rather than the deterministic ones if and whiIe. However, the ease in 
reasoning which nondeterminism offered, e.g., in dynamic logic, does not carry over 
to the present framework. The reason seems to be rooted in a fundamental difference 
between nondeterministic branching and random choice. One might say that 
probabilistic programs require quantitative and not absolute reasoning. One does not 
want to know whether it is possible for a certain state to be a final one, but how 
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possible it is, i.e., with what probability will the state indeed be final. Thus it seems 
that nondeterminism and probabilism (sic) are independent concepts. See also [9, 
p. 1131. 
The most natural first step in attempting to define a new language is to start with a 
propositional vesion. The reason this was not done in this paper is that, in order to be 
significant, such a language must include the ability to express probabilities. This 
requires variables over the reals which, in turn, call for functions and predicates, 
leading naturally to a first-order language. 
A reasonable such first-order language would have to include elementary analysis. 
Furthermore, even if the language does not explicitly contain the nat predicate (or, 
equivalently, integer variables) the addition of first-order programs over the reals 
adds it implicitly, since nat(v) is true iff the program 
xcO;while(x#uAx#--v)doxtx+l 
halts. 
Thus, if we are to have first-order probabilistic programs interpreted over the reals, 
it would seem that PrDL is the smallest useful language closed under conventional 
formation rules and capable of expressing interesting properties of these programs. 
Moreover, even without programs or the nat predicate, the validity problem of the 
underlying program-free language PrL will still be at least as undecidable as second- 
order arithmetic. This follows from the fact that for every closed formula P of first- 
order analysis one can build a formula P* of PrL without the nat predicate, which 
will be valid iff P is, in the following way: 
First, let Q be the formula 
Fr(x = 0) = 4 A Vv(Fr(x = u + 1) = 4 . Fr(x = v)) A Fr(true) = 1 
for a new element variable x. Replace each appearance of nat(u) by Fr(x = v) # 0; 
call the resulting formula P’. Finally, define P* to be Q 3 P’. It is not hard to see 
that P* is valid iff P is, since Q forces x to have a discrete distribution in which 
Fr(x = n) = (+)“+’ for integer n 2 0, and 0 otherwise. 
One way of achieving a less undecidable language is to completely separate the 
language of the domain of computation (events) from the language of analysis, by 
disallowing the appearance of global variables within events. In this case the language 
is actually decidable; however, its power is severly limited-e.g., there is no way of 
expressing properties similar to those in examples (5~(7), since each formula can 
refer only to a syntactically fixed finite number of events. 
Another approach to reducing the undecidability is to use only rationals for 
probabilities (cf. [ 191). This is too severe a limitation, however, since, for example, it 
is not difficult to write a program (using only integers, in fact) which halts with 
probability f \/z (cf. [ 91). 
In view of the high degree of undecidability of PrDL it is nevertheless of interest to 
formulate a decidable but useful propositional version of this language. This turns out 
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to be indeed possible, if one adopts propositional events and programs and restricts 
the first-order constructs to the outer level of the logic, i.e., to the language of 
analysis. In this vein our programs and events language is replaced by a propositional 
one similar to propositional dynamic logic [3]. The resulting propositional version of 
PrDL is introduced in [2] and is shown therein to be decidable. A similar 
propositional language less tied to the present logic PrDL is introduced in [lo] and is 
also shown to be decidable. 
At this point we should mention some approaches to program-free probabilistic 
logics, i.e., formal languages for stating static assertions which are evaluated on a 
probabilistic basis. These are Hoover [7], Zadeh [26], Gaifman [4] and Scott and 
Krauss [22]. At various stages in the development of PrDL we considered using 
ideas and notions from these papers for the underlying program-free language. None, 
however, turned out to be as satisfactory for a program oriented logic as the language 
presented herein. 
5. AN AXIOMATIC PROOF SYSTEM FOR PrDL 
Clearly our language is highly undecidable and hence does not admit of a complete 
axiomatization in the classical sense. It is of interest, however, to attempt a complete 
axiomatization in the spirit of [ 1, 61, i.e., relative to the underlying theory; in our case 
the valid formulas of PrL (i.e., the valid program-free formulas of PrDL). 
Consider the following system AX: 
Axioms 
AO. All axiom schemes of the first-order predicate calculus (using the extended 
delinitions of free occurrences of variables and substitutability). 
Al. ((cI}P)EP f or a program-free formula P containing no occurrences of Fr 
(and hence no program variables either). 
A2. (a}(P V Q) = {a} P V {a} Q. 
A3. {a) ,P E 1 {a}P. 
A4. {a} 3vP E &{a} P if u @J (x. 
A5. {x +- t} Fr(P) = v = Fr(P[x/t]) = u. 
A6. {xc ?} Fr(P) = u z Fr(P[x/random,(l)]) = u for any constant i such that 
the subterm random,(t) does not appear elsewhere in P for any program term t. 
A7. {a;p} P E {a}{/3} P. 
For the next axiom we introduce an abbreviation: for an event R, the program R ! 
will be thought of as standing for 
while -3 do SKIP 
(SKIP is any no-op like x t x). The program R! eliminates all mass which does not 
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satisfy R; it changes a probability measure to the unnormalized conditional 
probability Fr(* 1 R). Below we supply a special axiom for this program. 
A8. {if P then a else p} Fr(Q) = v 
G &({I’!; a} Fr(Q) = u A I-?!; /3} Fr(Q) = v - u). 
A9. {P!} Fr(Q) = ?.I = Fr(P A Q) = u. 
Inference Rules 
R 1. Modus Ponens 
R2. Generalization 
R3. while Rule 
Vsb’n nat(n) 2 (Q(n, s) 1 {A; a} Q(n + 1, s)) 
VsVn nat(n) I (Q(n, s) 2 Fr(g A R) = s(n)) 
~s(C~=~ s(n) = u A Q(0, s)) 3 {while P do a} Fr(R) = ZJ 
where s is thought of as a free function variable in Q representing a real sequence and 
the infinite sum is shorthand for the appropriate formula. (See end of Section 2.) 
We now rephrase some of the axioms in terms of probabilities. First, note that A5 
and A6 can be written, respectively, as 
Tl. {x e t} Pr(P) = 2) = Pr(P[x/t]) = u 
and 
T2. {x c ?) Pr(P) = u E Pr(P[x/rundon+( l)]) = U, 
since the total mass Fr(true) does not change (this is also a logical consequence of 
A5 and A6). Also, A9 can be written as 
T3. {P!) Pr(Q) = u E Pr(P A Q) = u . Pr(P), 
since the relative change in total mass is exactly Pr(P). This formula expresses the 
fact that the probability has changed to the conditional probability given P; u is 
actually Pr(Q (P). 
THEOREM 1 (SOUNDNESS). AX is a sound system for PrDL. 
Proof. We show the soundness of R3. The rest of AX is quite straightforward 
and is left to the reader. 
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Given a model A and state ,u, assume the premises are A-valid, and let 
f s(n)=uAQ(O,s) 
n=o 
Let s^ be an interpretation for s which satisfies this. By the assumption we have 
c,“. s^(n) = V(u). 
Since ,U k Q(0, s^), by the second premise we obtain ~1 k s”(0) = Fr(4’ A R), and 
by the first premise we obtain ,U k {P!; a} Q(l, s1), which by definition is the 
same as (~8 o e+)@) k Q(l, s^). From the second premise we now obtain 
(a-+@ 0 eM)(u) e Fr(-# A R) = s^( 1). 
In a similar fashion we obtain 
for every It > 0, i.e., 
(D 0 (a” 0 e+)“)(u) k Fr(R) = s”(n). 
Hence we can write 
from which, by summation, we obtain 
go kg2 o (a” 0 e,#)@)(lP) = f i(n). n=O 
The left-hand side is simply (while P do a)Agl)(R-X), and by our assumption the 
right-hand side is V(V). Therefore, by the semantics we get 
pl={whilePdoa}Fr(R)=u. 1 
For completeness we shall be needing a result from first-order dynamic logic. 
Theorem 3.2 of [6] states that for every arithmetical universe A the first-order 
language L is expressive for first-order DL. This means that for every formula P of 
DL there is a first-order formula Q(P) such that A k P - Q(P). We now observe that 
any model A’ of PrDL can be extended to an arithmetical universe (see [6, p, 291 for 
a definition) by providing an additional predicate nat(x) on the level of events which 
is true precisely for the nonnegative integers, and a means for encoding finite 
sequences of elements of D. Henceforth we shall assume that our models are so 
extended. 
Let a be a program of PrDL, and let a’ be a with all if-then-else and while-do 
constructs replaced by their regular counterparts in DL, and with all random 
assignments of the form x c ? replaced by 
Y+-y+ 1; x t rundom,( y) 
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for some new fixed variable y, and an appropriate constant integer i to be specified 
later. Let a0 be the program y t 0; a’. (For the purpose of this translation P! can be 
thought of either as the whiIe program specified before A8 above or simply as the P? 
of DL.) 
LEMMA 1. For every PrDL program a and for every event P, if the constant i 
used in defining a, is difSerent from all similar constants appearing in P, then 
{a} Fr(P) = v = Fr(@((a,) P)) = v 
is a valid formula of PrDL. 
ProoJ For the sake of the proof we can consider all terms of the form random,(t) 
for j # i simply as ordinary program variables. By the semantics, 
iuk lal(WP)=v) iff (aA X p”)(P”) = V(v). 
By Theorem 3.3.9 of [9], which states the equivalence of the two semantics given 
therein, it follows that the latter holds iff 
where f, is the function from D” x D” into itself which is the meaning of a in the 
first semantics of [9]. This is true because, by the assumption that the random 
variables other than random, are considered as ordinary program variables and that 
the latter do not appear in P, it follows that P is actually a cylinder depending only 
on the first o coordinates, i.e., PA= W x D” for some W or D”. (Note: in [9] the 
method for obtaining a new random value involves selecting the first in the infinite 
sequence of random values and then shifting the sequence to the left to expose the 
next one for selection. Here, the random values are obtained in order from the 
sequence, which in itself does not change. In essence, the methods are equivalent.) 
We now observe that 
P + Fr(@((aJ PI) = v iff 01 X p”>(@((aO) P)“) = v(v), 
and hence to complete the proof of the lemma it suffices to show that A =f; ‘(Pf) 
and B = @((a,) P>” are equal as sets. Indeed, (2, 7) E A means that starting a with 
values 2 for program variables and jj for the infinite sequence of random variables 
results in new values 2 for program variables which will be in W (the initial part of 
P”). By the equivalence of (a,,)P and @((aO) P) and the operational equivalence of a 
and a,,, and owing to the determinism of a,, (2,y) E B means the same thing. We 
omit the formal details. 1 
571/28/2-2 
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THEOREM 2 (EXPRESSIVENESS). For every PrDL formula P there is a formula P* 
of PtL such that 
Proof: The first step is to change all occurrences of Fr to be of the simple form 
Fr(P) = v for a variable v. This is accomplished by introducing new existentially 
quantified variables; e.g., Fr(P) = Fr(Q) is replaced by (3v)(Fr(P) = v A Fr(Q) = v). 
Next, all programs are “pushed” down over negations, disjunctions and quantifiers, 
so that programs appear only in formulas of the form {a,} . + - {ak} Fr(P) = v, or 
equivalently, {a, ; . . . ; ak} Fr(P) = v. (This process may necessitate some renaming.) It 
is sufficient, therefore, to find a program-free equivalent for every PrDL formula of 
the form {a} Fr(P) = v, which is immediate from Lemma 1. 1 
DEFINITION. Let L, be a language, and M be a model appropriate for L, . An 
axiom system A is said to be J-complete for L, relative to L, G L, if every J-valid 
formula of L, is provable in the system obtained from A by adding all J-valid 
formulas of L, as additional axioms. A is said to be complete relative to L, if it is .M- 
complete for every appropriate model .M. 
THEOREM 3 (COMPLETENESS). AX is a complete system for PrDL relative to the 
underlying program-free language PrL. 
Proof: The proof follows the lines of the arithmetical completeness of first-order 
DL [6, Chapter 31. In particular, from Theorem 3.1 of [6, p. 281 it follows that it is 
sufficient to prove the theorem for formulas of the form T 13 {a} U, for program-free 
T and U. This is because condition (1) of that theorem trivially holds, condition (2) 
is precisely our Theorem 2, condition (3) is easily seen to follow from our A2, A3 
and R2, condition (4.a) is subsumed by the definition of relative completeness, and 
condition (4.~) is covered by the ability in PrDL to push negations over programs, 
which in turn follows from the determinism of our programs. This leaves, therefore, 
only (4.b). 
Assume Mk= T 3 {a} U for program-free T, U. We show that T 2 {a} U is 
provable in AX augmented with all M-valid program-free formulas by induction on 
the structure of a. As in the proof of Theorem 2, we can assume w.1.o.g. that U is of 
the form Fr(P) = v. The reason for this is as follows: during the inductive steps of the 
analogue of this part of the proof from [6] one constructs subformulas of the form 
{/I} V, where p is a subprogram of a and hence is a candidate for the application of 
the inductive hypothesis. Now, even if one starts out with U of the form Fr(P) = v, 
this form is not guaranteed of V. However, one can then push in connectives over 
programs obtaining (possibly multiple copies of) /? applied to formulas of the desired 
form. Since the induction is on the structure of the program, the inductive hypothesis 
can then be used. 
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Again, all cases of a are trivial except for the case of a while loop. Let 
./!=TT {while P do a} Fr(R)=v. 
In order to apply the while-rule (R3) we have to find an appropriate Q(n, s). 
We will construct a formula Q(n, s) in PrL which is a formal version of the 
“formula” 
Vm>O{(P!;a)m} Fr(--PAR)= s(m+n). (*> 
First, we note that (*) satisfies both premises of R3. Now, since Q(n, s) itself will 
be in PrL, the first premise contains a single program smaller than the above while 
program (in an appropriate ordering), and the second premise is program-free. Hence, 
using the inductive hypothesis, both premises are provable. Denoting 
f s(n)=oAQ(O.s)j n=o 
by W, we can therefore prove 
W I> {while P do a} Fr(R) = u. 
However, our particular choice of Q(n, s) implies, as can be easily checked, that W 
is semantically equivalent to {while P do a} Fr(R) = u. Since, by our assumption, 
A I= T 1 {while P do a} Fr(R) = u, 
it follows that Mb T I> W, and hence T 3 W is provable as it is program-free. We 
conclude the provability of T 3 {while P do a} Fr(R) = v, as required. 
We now turn to the construction of the program-free equivalent of (*). Note that 
for any fixed value of m the formula 
{(P!;a)m} Fr(-PAR)= s(m+n) 
can be written in program-free PrDL by appealing directly to Lemma 1. The idea we 
use now is to insert the varying values for m into the formula by encoding the linite 
sequence of values encountered between successive iterations of P!; a. (Note that we 
are assuming the model has been extended to an arithmetical universe, as mentioned 
at the beginning of this section.) 
We use the following notation: let the vector X contain all the program variables 
appearing in a. In the following formula, Y and Z are new versions of the variables in 
X; each of the variables of Y is used to encode a finite sequence of values, using 
some standard coding technique. Y(k) refers to the kth value of this sequence. 
Equality tests, substitutions and assignments between such vectors are abbreviations 
for the corresponding pointwise operations. 
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The PrL equivalent for Q(n, s) is taken to be 
Vm nat(m) II Fr(!lY(Y(O) = X A Vk((nat(k) A 0 < k < m) 
3 3Z(Z = Y(k) A @((X t Z; P?; cq, > X = Y(k + 1)))) (**) 
A (-P A R)[Xfi(m)])) = s(m t n). 
The reader familiar with [6] will observe that the event under Fr in (**), which 
involves only existential quantification over the reals, is the first-order equivalent of 
((P?; aJm)(lP A R) with free variable m. The equivalence of (*) and (**) now 
follows directly from Lemma 1. 1 
6. EXAMPLE OF A PROOF 
We show how to prove the interesting part of the formula in example (6) of Section 
4. Namely, we prove the validity (in arithmetical models in which p is a uniform 
distribution over [0, 11) of Vk(nat(k) I q(k)), where q(k) is 
(k > 1 A Fr(true) = 1) 
~{i+l;xt?;whilex<~ do (x+?;i+-i+1)}Fr(i=k)=2-k. 
It should be noted that the proof below is a formal proof in a formal system, and 
hence by its very nature is rather symbol-ridden and tedious. 
Define the formula Q(n, s) with a free function variable s (to be used in an 
application of the while-rule (R3)) as follows: 
Q(n, s): Fr(true) = 2-” A Pr(i = II + 1) = 1 
A Pr(x < f) = f A S(s), 
where, using obvious abbreviations, 
S(s) : Vj nat(j) 1 (s(j) = [if k =j t 1 then 2-k else 01). 
Denoting the while-loop in (p by a, we will show below that the premises of rule R3 
are provable, yielding 
3s 
( 
F s(n) = u A Q(0, s)) 3 {a} Fr(i = k) = ~1. 
n=O 
However, the S(s) component of Q(0, s) uniquely determines the function s, and also 
forces the infinite sum to be equal to 2 -k, so that we actually have 
Q’(0) 2 {a} Fr(i = k) = 2-k, 
where Q’(n) is Q(n, s) without the conjunct S(s). 
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It is now easy to apply R2, A2, A3 and A7 to obtain 
{it l;xt?}Q’(O)~> {it l;xt?;a}Fr(i=k)=2-&. 
Hence, besides the premises of R3 we are left with proving 
(nat(k)Ak>lAFr(true)=l)I{i+-l;xt?}Q’(O), 
which together with (*) yields the final result. 
Indeed, we derive (**) by using A6 and T2 after deriving 
(*I 
(**I 
(nat(k) A k > 1 A Fr(true) = 1) 3 i c 1 }(Fr(true) = 1 A Pr(i = 1) = 1 { 
A Pr(random,-,( 1) < f) = f), 
which in turn is done by using A5 and Tl after deriving 
(nat(k) A k > 1 A Fr(true) = 1) 2 (Fr(true) = 1 A Pr(1 = 1) = 1 
A Pr(random,( 1) < 4) = 4). 
The latter formula is program-free, and by the assumptions governing relative 
completeness is provable if valid. Hence we should convince ourselves of its validity 
in the models described above. Now, assuming the antecedent of the implication, the 
first two conjuncts of the consequent are trivial, and the third follows from the 
assumed behaviour of p. This completes the formal proof of (**). 
We now show how to prove the premises of the while-rule R3. 
In order to prove the tirst premise 
~(n, S) I> {(x < b)!; x + ?; i + i + 11 Q(n + 1, S> 
we need only prove (after simplification) 
Q(n, s) 2 {(x < j)!}(Fr(true) = 2-(“+I) 
APr(i=n+ l)= 1 
A Pr(random,(l) < i) = i A S(S)), 
and then use A5 and A6 to get the required conclusion. (Tl and T2 may also be 
used.) 
Using A9 (and possibly T3) it suffices to derive 
Q(n, s) =) (Fr(x < $) = 2-(“+‘) 
A Pr(i = IZ + 1 A x < f) = 1 . Pr(x < 4) 
A Pr(rundom,( 1) < $ A x < f) = f * Pr(x < $) A S(S)). 
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Here again we have to convince ourselves of the validity of this program-free 
formula. The first conjunct follows trivially from Q(n, s). The second follows since 
Pr(x<f)=Pr(i=n+lAx<i)+Pr(i#n+lAx<f); 
but 
O(Pr(ifn+ 1 Ax<$)<Pr(i#n+ l)=O, 
the last equality following from Q(n, s), and so we have 
pr(x < 4) = Pr(i = ?I + 1 A X < 4)~ 
as required. For proving the third conjunct we use the independence of the random 
variables to replace 
Pr(random,(l) < i A x < 4) 
Pr(random,(l) < 1) * Pr(x < f) 
which is equal to f . Pr(x ( i), by the assumption on p. This completes the proof of 
the first premise of R3. 
The second premise of R3 is the program-free formula 
Q(n, s) I Fr(x > 4 A i = k) = s(n). 
By the remark above concerning the uniqueness of s implied by Q(n, s), this is simply 
Q(n,s)xFr(x>fAi=k)=[ifk=n+ 1then2-kelseO]. 
By the antecedent Q(n, S) we have Pr(i= n + 1) = 1, and so if kf n + 1, 
Pr(i = k) = 0, and consequently also Fr(i = k) = 0. Therefore for k # n + 1, 
Fr(x > f A i = k) = 0, and the else part of the formula holds. If k = n + 1, we have to 
show that Fr(x>iAi=n+ 1)=2-(“+l); since by Q(n, s) we have Fr(true) = 2-“, 
this amounts to showing that Pr(x > 4 A i = n + 1) = f. Now on the one hand 
Pr(x > f) = 1 - Pr(x < f) = f, 
and on the other hand 
Pr(x>$)=Pr(x>$Ai=n+l)+Pr(x>$Ai#n+l). 
However, 0 < Pr(x 2 f A i # n + 1) < Pr(i # n + 1) = 0, and so, combining the last 
two formulas, we get the desired result. This completes the proof. 
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7. THE DISCRETE CASE 
In this section we show that if we restrict ourselves to discrete probabilities (but 
not necessarily discrete domains), the underlying language PrL reduces to the 
language L of first-order analysis, in the sense that M-validity is preserved. 
Now, although for discrete p, p” is also discrete for all n, p” is not. Therefore, in 
this section we cannot allow events which do not define cylinders; a cylinder depends 
only on a finite number of the random variables. (Note that any event depends at 
most on a finite number of program variables.) We therefore translate every term of 
the form Fr(P) into Fr(3n cyl(P, n) A P), where cyl(P, n) is the following formula, 
stating that P is a cylinder depending only on the first n coordinates: 
A Vr P[random,/r] 
3 Vs(Vk(nat(k) A 1 < k < n 1 s(k) = r(k)) 3 P[randomJs]). 
Here the conjunction is taken over all i such that a term randomi appears in P. 
This translation means that we consider non-cylindrical formulas to be equivalent to 
false. Note that none of the axioms of AX introduce any new non-cylindrical 
formulas, nor do we use such formulas in any of our proofs, except for the formula 
used for Q(n, s) in the proof of the Completeness Theorem, which we replace by an 
equivalent formula in L below. Also, the axioms are still valid under this translation. 
All our previous results therefore still hold. Throughout this section we assume all 
PrL formulas are thus translated. Also, throughout this section, r, s and t are taken to 
be function variables representing sequences of reals. 
DEFINITION. Given a model M of PrL, the discrete model #d) is defined to be 
the same as .A except that only discrete states are considered, i.e., the states of J(d) 
are those measures which have their weight concentrated on a countable number of 
points (of D”). A formula P will be called A’d’-ualid if it is true in all states of 
.,K?(~), i.e., all discrete states of M, it will be called d-valid if it is .M”d’-valid for all 
.M in which p is discrete. 
By fixing the meanings of some constants, to be specified later, according to p, 
every model -4 of PrL induces a model M’ of L in the classical sense. 
We now formulate the main result of this section: 
THEOREM 4. For every formula P of PrL there is a formula Y(P) of L, such that 
for every model A in which p is discrete, P is MCd’-valid in PrL lr Y(P) is AI-valid 
in L. 
Proof. Recall from Section 3 that real-valued functions of integer variables are 
expressible in L; as stated there, we shall freely use and quantify over such functions. 
We represent every discrete state ,U by a pair (f,p) of functions: f: M x M + 9, 
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p: J’“+ 9; f lists all distinct sequences df(i, I),f(i, 2),...) which have non-zero 
probabilities (and possibly other sequences as well), and 
P(i) =LJ {(f(k l>,.N, 2),...,)}, i > 0. 
p is similarly described by a pair (r, q) such that q(i) =p{r(i)}. The model A’ 
derived from J will have the meanings of r and q fixed in this way to represent p. 
In order to build Y(P) we have to encode the Fr construct of PrL in L. Assume, 
for simplicity, that P contains only random,, variables. Extension to the general case 
is then immediate. First, we change all occurrences of Fr(P) in P to be of the form 
Fr(P) = u. Recall that we have assumed that P is already of the form 3n 
cyl(Q, n) A Q; hence, in fact, P is a cylinder. Then, we define P’ to be P with every 
subformula of the form Fr(P) = u, where P has only x1, x2 ,..., x, free, replaced by 
Vk (“at(k) A cyl(P, k) z) x p(i) q(jl) *.. q(j& = Z.J) 
where the sum is taken over all tuples (i,jr,...? j, ) for which the following formula 
holds: 
%(Vl(nat(f) A 1 < 1< k 3 s(l) = r(j,)) 
A P[x,/fi, 1) ,..., x,/f(i, n), random,/s]). 
We now define a formula A which states that the pair (f,p) actually represents a 
positive finite measure. 
Let 
A, : ViVj(nat(i) A nat(j) A i #j 1 %(nat(k) Af (4 k) +f(j, k))). 
A, states that f represents distinct sequences, 
A,: Vi(nat(i) 3 p(i) > 0). 
A, states that measures are indeed positive. 
A, : 3uVn nat(n) 3 k p(i) < 2, 
i i=O 
A, together with A, imply that the sum C,“,,p(i) is finite (i.e., (f,p) is a finite 
measure). Now, take A to be A, A A, A A,. 
We can now define Y(P) to be V’Vp(A 2 P’). It is easy to check that the theorem 
indeed holds for this definition. I 
COROLLARY. The axiom system AX is complete for proving d-validity of formulas 
in PrDL relative to the language L offirst-order analysis (with nat). 
In order to retain the completeness result we have to find an equivalent in L to the 
formula used for Q(n, s) in the proof of the Completeness Theorem. This is because 
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the event inside Fr in that formula need not be a cylinder, and hence cannot be 
transformed into a formula of L according to the method above. The observation we 
use is that for all terminating computations of a, only a finite (though potentially 
unbounded) number of random assignments can be made. We can therefore replace 
Q(n, s) by 
Vm nat(m) 2 Cp(i) q(j,) --. q(jk) = s(m + n) 
where the sum is taken over all i, k, and tuples (jl,...,jk) for which the following 
formula holds: 
3t(VE(nat(Z) A 1 < I < k 1 t(Z) = r(j,)) 
A @((((I’?; a)“; -P?)o)y = k A R)[x,/f(i, l),..., x,/f(i, n), rundom,/t]) 
where y is the variable used in the construction of ((P?; a)“; 1p?), to proceed 
through the random variables (see Section 5). 
We conclude by remarking that in the discrete case we can express in L things 
which are not, in general, expressible in PrL; e.g., the meta-formula (Zl,u)(M, p p P) 
can be written in L as 3f3p(A A P’). 
8. CONCLUSION 
We have presented a logic for reasoning about probabilistic programs, together 
with an axiom system for which we have proved completeness relative to first-order 
analysis (or an extension thereof in the continuous case). We feel that this kind of 
work is necessary if we are to understand the principles governing probabilistic 
algorithms, which are becoming of increasing interest. 
This paper can be viewed as being concerned with the “interpreted” approach to 
probabilistic programs, and is analogous to the work on first-order dynamic logic and 
its arithmetical completeness which, in turn, grew out of work of Hoare and Cook on 
the partial correctness of conventional programs. 
Still in this approach, there is more work to be done. It would be of interest to 
develop similar formalisms and obtain similar results for recursive and concurrent 
probabilistic programs, and also to enable reasoning about the internal states, as in 
recent work on temporal and process logics of conventional programs. Despite the 
independence of the concepts of nondeterminism and probabilism discussed in 
Section 4, there is reason to believe that the study of a language which would allow 
both random choice and unquantified nondeterministic branching (and which would 
therefore require two dual versions of the {a} operator) could be both beneficial and 
interesting. G. Plotkin has pointed out to us the relevance of this idea to the 
construction of complex powerdomains for providing the semantics of such programs. 
Perhaps of greater pragmatic value would be work on less formal but more flexible 
methods for proving certain restricted kinds of assertions about probabilistic 
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programs, such as partial correctness and termination-with-certainty in the sense of 
the examples in Section 4. This would parallel the search for such methods in the 
realm of conventional programs, as in the work of Floyd, Burstall, Manna and others. 
Some promising ideas in this direction appear in [23, 81. In particular, we feel that 
there might be a strong connection between our axiom system and the method 
presented in [23]. 
Following comments in a preliminary version of this paper, decidable propositional 
versions have been introduced in [2, lo] as discussed in Section 4. This line of 
research still offers many interesting problems for further work. 
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